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VOL. II MARCH, 1948 No. 3
INCOME TAX BASIS AND FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
LOUIS F. SNETMAN0
R EAL ESTATE is the staple commodity of Florida's
economy, and it is consequently the subject matter
of the majority of the legal practice in Florida. This fact
accepted, it becomes important that the good general
practitioner know all that he can know concerning the
handling of real estate matters. Today, this knowing all
that one can know entails a great deal more than a famil-
iarity with deeds and mortgages and a long experience
in the examination of abstracts of title. It also requires a
modicum of understanding of the effect that Federal
Taxation has on ,ach stqI, that 1h lawyer takes in dealing
with these real estate questiols.'
I
The purpose of this article is to discuss one phase of
the application of the law of Federal Taxation to trans-
actions concerning real property, and that phasp is the
broad and often overlooked subject of the basis for de-
termining gain or loss to the taxpayer upon the sale or
other disposition of the realty, in tax parlance "finding
the base". The Internal Revenue Code proceeds on the
* Member of the Florida Bar; A.B. University of Florida, 1939; LL.B.
Harvard University, 1942.
1 This article has been written for the general practitioner in an effort
to be simple and clear. There is little, if anything, here to startle or
confnind the expert .
,l11JAll LAfft Q1/.RTI-RI[)'
premise that some part of the amount that a taxpayer
either actually, as in the case of a sale, or constructively,
as in the case of an exchange, receives upon the sale or
exchange of property which he owns, represents the in-
vestment put into that property by him or by his prede-
cessors in interest. This portion of the amount received
is to be treated as a return of capital to the taxpayer and
he is not to be taxed on this portion, but only on the
difference between it and the amount that he actually
or constructively receives. He may be taxed on this dif-
ference in different ways depending on the determination
of questions which are not now our concern.? In any
event, he is taxed only on this difference.
In order to determine this difference, we must first
determine the portion that is not to be taxed. Determin-
ing that portion is determining the basis for tax purposes,
2 The rates at which the person who makes a sale or exchange would
be taxed would be those provided in sections 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the
Internal Revenue Code, unless the property sold or exchanged were
considered to be a capital asset, or property to be treated as if it were
a capital asset; if the latter were true, the tax would then be imposed
in the manner provided in section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.
What constitutes a capital asset for tax purposes is not the easiest
question to answer, and fortunately is not our concern here. The
statutory definition of a capital asset is stated in section 117(a) (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and if the property in question is determined
to be a capital asset, the gain thereon is then subject to tax as provided
in section 117, and it becomes necessary to know the basis of the
property as defined in section 113 to arrive at. the aneouni. of the gain.
if any. on the sale or exchange. A complete discitssion of the types of
property the gain or loss on which is"subject to treatment under the
capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code may he found in
3 Mertens, Law of Federal Incomo Taxation, sees. 22.04 of sel . (herein-
after cited as Mertens).
If the property is not a capital asset, and it is not subject to the
umusual provisions of section 1174j) dealing with property that is to be
treated as if it were a capital asset, it remains equaily necessary to
determine the basis, since we must know how much the gain is in
order to find out the amount of earned income which has been received.
See tnt. Rev. Code, see. 111.
Real estate is not always a capital asset. For example, where a
person is a dealer in real estate lolding certain land for sale to custo-
mers in the ordinary course of his businesq, his gains and losses are
ordinary, and are not subject to the limitations of section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code. J. 0. Chapman, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec. Serv.
1144, 1731 (1944). Queensh or Corp., 16 B.T.A. 1216 (1942).
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which is our problem here. Thus, when real property is
disposed of by sale or otherwise, there is to some extent
a return of capital, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, applying the Internal Revenue Code, taxes the
increment over and above this return of capital. The
Commissioner, in effect, says to the taxpayer, "This real
estate that you have sold or otherwise disposed of rep-
resented some figure in money, in your hands, no matter
how you acquired it, and I am not going to tax you on any
part of that figure. If you have disposed of the property
for more than that figure, you have made a gain, and I
am going to tax you on the difference between that figure
and the amount of money you actually or theoretically
received on disposition. If you have disposed of the prop-
erty for less than that figure, you have incurred a loss,
and I may in some circumstances let you use the difference
between that figure and the amount you actually or theo-
retically received as a credit against other gains that you
have made."3
The manner in which that figure of which the Com-
missioner has been speaking, or the "base", is arrived at
in any real estate transaction is a complicated and often
a seemingly unreal procedure. No matter the complexity
and lack of reality, every time that a parcel of real estate
is disposed of it is necessary for someone to determine the
base, immediately as to the transferor and eventually as
to the transferee, in order to know how much of the
proceeds of the transaction are subject to tax as gain or,
as loss, may be allowed as a deduction against other gains.'
II
In determining the base, there are certain fundamental
concepts that must first be understood. The basis pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code are to be found in
Section 113.1 This section has several subsections, of which
(a) and (b) are of present importance. Subsection (a)
provides for the method by which one arrives at the un-
adjusted basis of property upon a sale or other disposi-
tion. Subsection (b) sets forth the procedure by which
3 int. Rev. Code, see. 117(e).
4 See Note 3, supra.
This section contains the entire statutory direction for determining
tihi iasis of property for tax purposes.
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the unadjusted basis is adjusted to reach the figure that
is actually used in order to determine the gain or loss
which results from the disposition of the property. Sub-
section (b) provides for adjustments in the nature of
capital repayments, capital expenditures, depreciation, de-
pletion, obsolescence and amortization. Each of these
provides in itself material for several papers, and the
subject matter is quite technical and often of limited
interest; the lawyer is infrequently required to work out
these adjustments or to handle problems or answer ques-
tions concerning them. For the purpose of this discussion,
then, it is proposed to consider only the unadjusted basis,
and to leave for another occasion the various adjustments
which must be made.
Before a consideration of the various rules by which
the basis is reached in any particular situation, it is well
to keep in mind that the burden of proof of establishing
a basis is always on the taxpayer, and this is true no
matter what the difficulties in its establishment.'
III
The first rule of law in dealing with a basis problem
is that the cost of the property is the figure to be
used as the basis in all situations save where the In-
ternal Revenue Code specifically states to the contrary.7
This is the general rule, and in the absence of a specified
exception, is to be applied. For familiar example: A buys
Blackacre, which we shall assume is a capital asset as
defined in Section 117, Internal Revenue Code, for five
thousand dollars, and one year later, on Miami's risinT
market, he sells it to a willing tourist for ten thousand
dollars. The basis to A, since the transaction does not
come within one of the specified exceptions in the Internal
Revenue Code, is his cost of five thousand dollars, and he
therefore has a gain of five thousand dollars, upon which
he is taxable in this instance accordine to the capital gain
limitations of the Internal Revenue Code.
While it is correct to say that cost is the basis to be
used in all cases save those that come within the excep-
6 Stock Yards National Bank of South St. Paul v. Commissioner,
153 F. 2d. 708 (C.C.A., 8th, 1946). Long v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d. 270
IC.C.A., 9th, 1938), Cert. Den. 305 U. S. 616, 83 L. Ed. 392 (1938).
7 The lngtmge of Tnt. Rev. Cntle, see. 113(a) so states.
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tions enumerated in the Internal Revenue Code, there are
some problems involved in the determination of cost, which
apply to real estate transactions. One typical situation
in Florida is that of the real estate subdivider or devel-
oper who buys several acres of land which he then divides
into lots and sells by lots. Under the applicable cases,s this
taxpayer is required to determine the cost price of each
lot sold and to report the gain or loss thereon in the year
in which the particular lot is sold. The allocation ulti-
mately made need not be by area alone, but may consider
location, assessed valuation of the local tax assessor, front
feet, tentative sale price and any other legitimate 'quali-
fying factors.9 This allocation of cost will be approved,
provided reasonable grounds of the kind here enumerated
are used.1"
Where the taxpayer acquires the land in a condemnation
proceeding, the rule for determining the cost, and thus
the basis, is stated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
be that the condemnation award plus the award for
severance damages to, and a special benefit assessment
against, the remaining part of the affected real estate
make up one proceeding and must be considered as a
unit in determining the basis to the taxpayer upon his
subsequent sale or exchange.1'
If one purchases improved real estate with the inten-
tion to tear down part of the building in order to improve
it, the cost of the demolition must be added to the original
purchase price to reach the basis.'2 However, the intention
to rebuild must be present at the time that the purchase
is made.13
S National Memorial Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 145 F. 2d. 1008
(C.C.A., 4th, 1944), D.S. Clarke, 22 B.TA. 314 (1931). U. S. Treas, Reg.
111, see. 19.22(a)-11.
9 Biscayne Bay Islands Co., 23 B.T.A. 7.31 (1911). Rosemont Co., 18
B.T.A. 200 (1929).
10 Hannibal Missouri Land Co., 9 B.T.A. 1072 (1928). J.S. Cullinan,
5 B.T.A. 996 (1927), aff'd. in effect at 19 B.T.A. 930 (1930). T.T. 1843,
-fL-2 Cum. Bull. 72.
" Commissioner v. Estate of Appleby, 123 F. 2d. 700 (C.C.A., 2d.,
1941). G.C.M. 20322, 1938 Cum. Bull. 167.
12 G.C.M. 23698, 1943 Cum. Bull. 340.
11U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, sec. 19.23(e)-2, Providence Journal Co. v,
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Of interest to real estate buyers in a community where
f6reclosures are as frequent as they are in Florida is the
consideration of the basis of property acquired by fore-
closure. When the mortgagee buys in the property at the
master's sale, his basis is the amount bid for the property,
which is assumed to be the fair market value at the time
of acquisition; however, if it appears that the fair market
value of the property is not the same as the bid price,
the fair market value will be used to establish the basis.
4
Suppose the taxpayer sells the property at a profit and
takes back a purchase money mortgage which he later
forecloses and thereby reacquires the property. It is held,
first, that the profit on the original sale, which is treated
as a completed transaction, is taxable income; and, second,
that the price paid on repurchase at the foreclosure sale
is the new basis in a transaction which is entirely separate
from the original sale.'5
Property almost always comes mortgaged in Florida.
What is the basis of real estate on which there is a mort-
gage, and does it matter whether the taxpayer took the
property subject to the mortgage or assumed and agreed
to pay it? Prior to the recent decision in the case of Crane
v. United States,'6 the above question was another of the
many unanswered ones in the tax law. The law formerly
seemed to be that one who took real property subject to
a mortgage could not add to the actual cash consideration
the amount of the mortgage; but if he assumed and agreed
to pay the mortgage, then lie was compelled to add it to
the actual cash consideration in order to arrive at his tax
basis." The Commissioner of Internal Revenue never
cared for this rule and actively litigated to have it
changed; his persistence finally succeeded, when the
Broderick, 25 F. Supp. 940 (D.C., R.I., 1938), aff'd. 104 F. 2d. 614
(CC.A., 1st, 1939).
14U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, sec. 29.23(k)-3. James J. Reilly, 46 B.T.A.
1246 (1942). Carolyn H. Snell, P-H 1944 T.C. Mem. Dec. Serv. 42,401
(1944). See 3 Mertens, sec. 21.10 (1942), wherein the rule to the effect
that the basis is the fair market value is stated and discussed.
tS Jacob M. Dickinson, Jr., et a], Exec'r., 18 B.T.A. 790 (1930). Ed-
ward S. Phillips, 9 B.T.A. 1016 (1927).
16 91 U.S. Sup. Ct., L. Ed. 931 (April 14, 1947) (advance sheet).
1?Tnited States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 82 L, Ed. 1018 (1938).
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Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals
which had reversed the Tax Court in the case of Crane v.
United States."s Here, the question was squarely pre-
sented and the decision squarely handed down. It now
makes no difference whether the mortgage is assumed
by the taxpayer, or whether he simply takes subject to it.
To establish his basis, he must add the amount of the
mortgage due at the time of the sale to the amount that
he actually pays, and this is true in order to arrive at his
basis for purpose of depreciation as well as for the pur-
poses of resale or exchange.9 Upon resale, of course, it
follows that he adds the amount then due on the mortgage
to the actual consideration he receives to reach the amount
which he realizes on the sale.
It may sometimes be necessary to point out to the pur-
chaser of real estate that he may not allocate his cost
among the several possible estates, easements and profits
in land, but must apply his cost, or basis, to the fee simple
absolute title which he buys.20
Upon occasion, one encounters the situation where the
taxpayer acquired real estate for cash plus a promise to
support the grantor during the remainder of the grantor's
life. Here, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has ruled that
the taxpayer may add the value of these payments for
support to his original cash outlay to arrive at.his basis?'
Also, there is still much recently homesteaded lanl in some
counties in Florida, and the rule to be applied where prop-
erty has been acquired by homesteading is that the basis
is the fair market value at the date of acquisition of the
homestead.2
All rules concerning basis are subject to one qualifica-
tion, which has to do with the time of acquisition. If the
property, the basis of which is to be determined, was ac-
quired prior to March 1, 1913, no matter how it was
is See Note 16, supra.
19 Crane v. United States, 91 U.S. Sup. Ct., L. Ed. 931, at 935 (April
14, 1947) (advance sheet).
20 Searles Real Estate Trust, 25 B.T.A. 1115 (1932). William Robert
Farmer, 1 B.T.A. 711 (1925).
21 G.C.M. 11655. X-II Cum. Bull. 160.
22 O.D. 386, IT Cum. Bull, 33. See also 3 Mertens, sec. 21.34 (1942).
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acquired, its basis is either the basis otherwise arrived
at in the manner set forth in the applicable subsection of
Section 113, Internal Revenue Code, or it is the fair mar-
ket value of the property as of March 1, 1913, whichever
is the greater.23 This rule is for the purpose of establishing
gain only. If there has been a loss, the fact that the
property was acquired prior to March 1, 1913, would be of
no consequence, and the loss would be computed in the
usual way by using the cost as of the date of acquisition
as the basis.
The phrase, "fair market value", as distinguished from
cost", is a key one in discussing the basis of property,
for it may have to be used in any type of situation. Fair
market value has been judicially defined as the price at
which a willing buyer would buy and a willing seller would
sell. 4 The simplicity of the definition is misleading as the
great number of valuation problems that have required
litigation will indicate. However, for present purposes, it
is necessary merely to point out that the value at which the
real estate is returned for estate tax purposes has been
held to determine prima facie the fair market value of the
property for basis purposes, in a decedent's estate.2 The
presumption is, of course, rebuttable by other evidence.2
IV
With the above survey of the general rule, it is now
timely to consider the various exceptions to this rule as
they may arise in real estate transactions. Perhaps first
in importance among these is the treatment as to basis
accorded to property acquired by "bequest. devise or in-
heritance". 7 The principles here applicable are distinct
23 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a)(14). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, sec. 29.113(a)-1
and 2, as amended by T.D. 5402. Sept. 5, 1944. For a list of decisions
where the fair market value of real estate was determined by litigation,
see P-H Fed. Tax Serv.. 10588 (1947).
24 Union National Bank of Pittsburgh et al., Exec'rs. v. Driscoli et al.,
32 F. Supp. 661 (D.C., Pa., 1940). Wood, Adm'r. v. United States, 29 F.
Supp. 853 (C. Cls., 1939).
25 Charles Bertram Currier, 7 T.C. 980 (1946). Elizabeth J. Bray,
Adm'r., 4 B.T.A. 42 (1926).
26 Elizabeth G. Augustus, 40 B.T.A. 1201 (1939). Edwards v. Douglas,
269 U.S. 204, 70 L. Ed. 235 (1925).
27 This is the language of Int. Rev. Code, see. 113(a) (5).
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unto themselves. The Internal Revenue Code provides in
general that the basis of property thus acquired shall be
the fair market value of the property at the time of
acquisition. 2 From the inference of the language used in
the Internal Revenue Code, and from the Regulations 29
issued pursuant thereto, it is clear that the "time of
acquisition" means either the date of the decedent's death
from whom the property is acquired, or, in cases where
the optional valuation date is used for Estate Tax pur-
poses as permitted by Section 811(j) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, one year after the date of the decedent's death.3
Thus, the basis of property acquired by devise or inherit-
ance is the fair market value of the realty either at the
date of the death of the decedent or one year thereafter.31
There is a third possible date on which the property may
have to be valued to determine its basis in the hands of
the devisee or heir. If the personal representative of a
decedent's estate elects the optional valuation date, and
then sells, disposes of, or distributes the property on a
date less than one year after the decedent's death, then
the basis is the fair market value at the time the property
is sold, disposed of, or otherwise distributed.
32
This doctrine is simple enough on casual inspection, but
there are several questions lurking in the language. Lead-
ing among them is whether this rule for determining basis
is to be applied to property taken by a contingent as well
as a vested remainderman. The answer, as stated in the
case of Helvering v. Reynolds," is now in the affirmative,
21 See Note 27, supra.
29 U.S. Treas. Reg. ill, sec. 29.113a) (5)-1.
30 In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code was amended by adding to sec.
113(a) (5) language providing that where an executor elects to use the
date one year after the date of decedent's death as the date for the
evalution of the decedent's estate, as he is permitted to do by Int. Rev.
Code, see. 811(j), then the time of acquisition for basis purposes shall
be this optional valuation date. Thus, if the executor so elects, the fair
market value of the property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance
is determined one year after the date of decedent's death.
31 See supra in this article, for a discussion of the phrase "fair market
value" .
32 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (5) and sec. 811(j). U.S. Tress. Reg. 111,
sec. 29.113(a)(5)-1-b-3. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, sec. 81.11.
13 313 US. 428, .5 T. Ed. 1439 (1941).
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and to the effect that it makes no difference whether the
estate is contingent or vested, present or future, the basis
is to be determined in the same manner, and the date of
acquisition for valuation purposes is the date of the de-
cedent's death or one year thereafter at the option of the
personal representative. This result was reached, how-
ever, only after protracted litigation and much difference
of opinion.
4
As a necessary ramification of the decision in Helvering
v. Reynolds, it is now also the law that no adjustment for
the value of intervening life estates is to be made to the
basis as regards the remainderman; he is entitled to the
full valuation of the property without regard to the life
estate.35
Will contests and litigation as to the right of inheritance
are not infrequent, and there are two important rules
affecting them to be remembered in taking title to real
estate as a result of such contests. In the first place, if
the property is acquired by inheritance either directly or
as the result of litigation deciding the invalidity of a will,
the basis is the fair market value at the date of decedent's
death and not at the date of the ending of the litigation,
if there is any. Secondly, where will contests are settled
by the parties, and there is consequently a readjustment
of interests acquired under the will but the readjustment
is not based on any claii of inheritance, it is held.that
this new acquisition is by way of contract and not by way
of devise so that the basis of the property redistributed
is the fair market value as of the date of the settlement
contract and not as of the date of the decedent's death. 7
There is further to be considered the basis to the deced-
ent's estate of property acquired by it from the decedent.
In such cases, the Internal Revenue Code provides that the
basis is the fair market value on the date of death or one
34 See 3 Mertens, sec. 21.60, n. 4 (1942), and cases there cited.
35 Robert E. McGrath, 30 B.T.A. 562 (1934), aff'd. sub. nom. Fidelity
and Columbia Trust Co., Trustee v. Commissioner, 90 F. 2d. 219 (C.C.A.,
6th, 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 723, 82 L. Ed, 558 (1937). Huggett v.
Burnet, 64 F. 2d. 705 (C.A., D.C., 1933).
36 Quigley v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d. 27 (C.C.A., 7th, 1944).
17 Mertz v. Hickey, 68 F. Supp, 159 (D.C., N.Y., 1946).
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year thereafter, whichever is elected, or on the date when
the property is sold or distributed, in other words, the
usual rule."
The basis to the survivor of joint tenancies or of ten-
ancies by the entireties is of vital importance in Florida,
since so much realty is taken in this manner. It is now
decided that the basis to the survivor on sale or exchange
is the original cost of the property at the time it was
acquired by the co-tenants, since a survivor of a joint
tenancy or a tenancy by the entireties does not take by
devise or inheritance.9
As in all basis considerations, it must be stated that
property acquired by devise or inheritance is subject to
special treatment if it was so acquired prior to March 1,
1913. The Internal Revenue Code provisions are deter-
minative here,40 and they state that the basis to be used
in determining gain is either the fair market value at the
date of decedent's death or the fair market value as of
March 1, 1913, whichever is the greater. Note that this
rule is applicable only to the situation in which there is a
gain. If a loss is incurred, it would seem that the fact
that the property- was acquired prior to March 1, 1913,
would be of no consequence and that the loss would be
computed in the usual way by using the fair market value
as of the date of decedent's death as the basis. 1
V
The next general question to consider is property ac-
quired by gift. Here, again, the language of the Internal
Revenue Code is clear enough. It provides that property
acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, has the same
basis in the hands of the donee as it had in the hands of
the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was
not acquired by gift, except that for purposes of determin-
ing loss the basis shall be either the basis as determined
in the above manner or the fair market value of the
39 Int. Rev. Code, see. 113(a) (5). See Estate of Edwin Hodge, 2 T.C.
643 (1943).
39 Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 77 L. Ed. 1066 (1933). See
Albert B. Bernstein, Tax Dangers in Estates by the Entiretes, 1 Miami
L.Q. 86, for a thoughtful discussion of this subject.
40 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (14).
41 See I Mertens, see. 21.73 (1942).
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property at the time of the gift, whichever is the lower.42
This section of the Internal Revenue Code has been held
to be constitutional in the case of Taft vs. Bowers.4 3
It is important to know that the exception stated above
with reference to the computation of basis for purposes
of loss came into the law in 1934; prior to that time,
basis was computed in the same manner whether the re-
sult was a gain or a loss.
44
Suppose the donor himself acquired the property by
gift. The Internal Revenue Code would seem to take care
of this situation in so far as it states "or the last preceding
owner by whom it was not acquired by gift".45 However,
suppose the present donor acquired the property by gift
prior to December 31, 1920, when the provisions for basis
of property acquired by gift were first put into the law.
In these circumstances, it is provided that the basis of
property acquired by gift from a donor who himself
acquired the property by gift prior to December 31, 1920,
is the fair market value of the property at the time of
acquisition by the present donee."
There has beeh a change in the law relative to the basis
of property which was the subject matter of a gift in
trust. Prior to 1942, it was held that where property was
acquired by way of a gift in trust the basis was to be
the same as the basis in the hands of the grantor, in-
creased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount
of loss recognized to the grantor upon such transfer.47
This was obviously different from the normal treatment
afforded gifts. However, section 143(b) of the 1942
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code,4 and the Reg-
42Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (2).
43 278 U.S. 470, 73 L. Ed. 460 (1929).
44 See 3 Mertens, sec. 21.41 (1942).
45 "The basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the
donor, or the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by
gift." Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (2).
46 E.D. Knight, 28 B.T.A. 188 (1933). int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (4).
47 The cases decided prior to the 1942 'amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code stated that sec. 113(a) (3) applied to gratuitous transfers
in trust rather than sec. 113(a)(2). Title Guarantee and Trust Co.,
Trustee, 42 B.T.A. 748 (1940), aff'd. 123 F. 2d. 819 (C.C.A., 2d., 1941).
4.9 Sec, 143(b) of the 1942 Revenue Act amended section 113(a)(3)
(Vol. 2
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ulations 49 issued by the Internal Revenue Department pur-
suant thereto, have now cleared up all controversy, and
all transfers which are gifts, whether in trust or outright,
are to be treated in the same fashion, and the rules
applicable to gifts generally are equally applicable to gifts
in trust.
Where a gift is held to be in contemplation of death
and therefore includable in the gross estate of the donor
for estate tax purposes upon his death, the basis of the
property which is the subject matter of the gift is ar-
rived at in the same manner as is the basis of any other
gift. 0 While this seems logical enough, there was dispute
about it, and some of the earlier laws provided otherwise.5
A gift may have been made so long ago that it is
impossible to tell what the basis of the property was in
the hands of the donor. In such case, the Internal Revenue
Code52 provides that the Commissioner's determination of
the fair market value of the property as of the date or
approximate date that the property which is the subject
matter of the gift was acquired by the donor shall be final
as to the basis of the property in the hands of the present
donee.
Property is often acquired through the exercise of a
power of appointment. If the power is exercised by will,
without consideration, the basis in the hands of the donee
of the property is the value of the property at the date of
the death of the donee of the power, which is the time
so as to exclude from its operation a transfer in trust made by way of
gift, bequest or devise. This means, of course, that gifts which are
transfers in trust are now treated as are all other gifts in the determi-
nation of basis, a.% provided in section 113(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
49 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, sec. 29.113(a)(2)-l. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, see.
29.113 (a) (3)-1.
so It is now held that Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (2) is applicable to
gifts in contemplation of death as well as to other gifts, and not Int.
Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (3). Helene V.B. Wurlitzer, 29 B.T.A. 658 (1934),
aff'd. 81 F. 2d. 928 (C.C.A., 6, 1936). Prior to the 1942 amendment by
section 143 of the 1942 Revenue Act, some cases held otherwise. See
3 Mertens, sec. 21.42 (1942).
51 See 3 Mertens, sec. 21.42, n. 29 (1942).
52 See Note 42. supra.,
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when the power was exercised.53 However, where the
power of appointment is exercised other than by will,
without consideration, the basis is the same as it is in all
other gifts, and is thus the cost or other proper basis to
the donor of the power.
5 4
VI
Another exception to the general rule of cost as basis
deserves brief consideration. Section 113(a) (9) of the
Internal Revenue Code states that property acquired as a
result of a compulsory or involuntary conversion shall
have the same basis as the property so converted, de-
creased in the amount of any money received by the
taxpayer which is not used for the purpose of replacing
the destroyed property and increased by the amount of
gain recognized on the conversion. This provision, like
other provisions dealing with substituted basis, is an effort
to keep the taxpayer whole but not to permit him to make
an untaxed profit out of the transaction. Its applicability
to real estate is only in terms of the improvements that
are upon the land and may be considered only in relation
to the basis of the building and not of the land. The rule




A familiar technique for postponing taxes is that pro-
vided by Sections 113(a)(6) and 112(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, the tax-free exchange of properties of like
kind. Section 112(b) states that an exchange may be
treated as tax-free, where property held solely for pro-
ductive use in trade or business or for investment is
exchanged for property of a like kind which is also to be
held solely for productive use or for investment. The key
words are "investment" and "trade or business". It will
serve no purpose here to attempt to give any other defini-
tion to these words than the ones normally and usually
53Int. Rev. Code, see. 113(a)(5). This is true because the actual
transfer took place at death, and thus the property should be subject
to the same basis provisions as all other property passing at death.
54 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 113(a) (2). Acquisition in this fashion Is exactly
like any other gift and should be treated the same way for basis
purposes.
5I.S. Trons. Reg. 111, see. 29.1l3rn)rR)-1.
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associated with them. To explain, your astute.client, A,
who is a dentist and not a dealer in real estate at all, owns
and holds for investment Blackacre, a parcel of unim-
proved real estate which he bought in 1927 for $1,000, and
which now is worth $25,000. If he exchanges Blackacre
for an office building having a fair market value of $25,000
and intends to hold the office building as an investment,
the exchange is tax-free when completed, since there has
been an exchange of property of a like kind and the new
parcel is also being held for investment. 6 In a situation
as here described, Section 113(a) (6) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code provides that the basis to A of the office
building that he received on the exchange is $1,000, that
is to s.ay, the same basis that Blackacre had in his hands.
Thus, the office building now has a substituted basis of
$1,000, but A has to pay no tax at the time of the exchange.
At such time as he sells the office building, he will pay a
tax on the difference between the sale price and his basis
of $1,000, subject to the capital gain provisions of Section
117 of the Internal Revenue Code. 7
VIII
One Section of the "tax-free exchange" provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code is perhaps more widely known
among people who own real estate than the other sections,
and that is the section providing for the transfer of prop-
erty to a corporation controlled by the transferor.8 Gain
or loss on the transfer is nolt recognized if one or more
persons transfer property to a corporation solely in ex-
change for its stock or securities, and immediately after
the exchange the transferor or transferors are in control
of the corporation. For example, Mr. Smith owns- an
apartment house, which cost him $60,000 including land
and building, and Mr. Jones owns a hotel, which he pur-
56U.S. Treas, Reg. 111, 29.113(a) (6)-1, as amended by T.D. 5402,
Sept. 5, 1944.
57 The subject of tax-free exchanges between individuals is a large
one, and there are many complicated situations beyond the ones here
discussed. It is not desired to go further Into these situations at this
time, but for those readers who are adventurous, see 3 Mertens, sec.
20.16 et seq. for a full treatment of the subject.
55 Tnt. Rev. Code, see. 112(b)(5).
214 ifIlI LJIi QUJRTERLY [Vul. 2
chased for $50,000, including land and building. If Mr.
Smith and Mr. Jones transfer their respective properties
'to a corporation in exchange for its stock, there would be
no tax to either on the transfer, and the properties will
have the same basis in the hands of the corporation that
they did in the hands of the individuals. However, this is
only true if, immediately after the transfer, Mr. Smith
and Mr. Jones together own at least 80% of the total
capital stock of the corporation ;59 and further if, immedi-
ately after the transfer, the amount of the capital stock
received by Mr. Smith is substantially proportionate to the
value of his interest in the apartment house prior to the
exchange, and the amount of capital stock received by Mr.
Jones is substantially in proportion to the value of his
interest in the hotel prior to the exchange.
If the apartment house was subject to a mortgage or
other liability, these are considered as stock or securities
received by Mr. Smith so that in practical effect it is
assumed that only the equity in the property is trans-
ferred. Assume that the apartment house was subject to
a $10,000 first mortgage. If, immediately after the trans-
fer, 1,000 shares of $100 par value stock having been
issued, Mr. Smith owned 500 shares and Mr. Jones owned
500 shares, the exchange would still be tax-free.0
All transactions that come within the purview of section
112(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code are, of course,
not so simple as these here discussed. There are many
variations on the theme, and the one most frequently
encountered is that dealing with "stock or securities". 1
The difficult problem is to decide what is a security.6 2 In
this paper, it is sufficient to warn the reader to brief
thoroughly the question of whether the various kinds of
stocks, bonds, or notes that he proposes to have the cor-
poration issue are securities falling within the definition
of that word as set out in the Regulations and judicial
decisions.
59 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 112(h).
60 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, see. 29.112(b) (5)-2.
61 See Note 58, supra.
62 For a survey of this phase of the subject, see P-H4 Fed. Tax Serv.,
paragraph 10254, et seq. (1948).
